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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-SUSPENSION STATUS TO REINSTATE-
MENT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS-CLAIMANT'S BURDEN OF
PROOF-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a claim-
ant need not supply expert medical evidence to establish that a
work-related injury continues; instead, once a claimant testifies
that a work-related injury continues, the burden of proof shifts
to the employer to prove the contrary.
Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die
Casting Co.), 642 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 1994).
John Latta (the "Appellant") suffered a work-related injury to
his right arm while employed at Latrobe Die Casting Co. (the
"Employer").1 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workers' Compen-
sation Act (the "Act"),2 the Appellant was paid workers' compen-
sation benefits for total disability.3 Subsequently, he returned to
work in a light-duty capacity' and his workers' compensation
1. Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.),
642 A.2d 1083, 1083 (Pa. 1994). The injury occurred on March 24, 1977. Latta, 642
A.2d at 1083.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603 (1992 & Supp. 1994). Employers are lia-
ble for compensation for personal injuries to their employees provided that the injury
occurred in the course of employment, without regard to the negligence or fault of
the employer or employee. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431. An employee may present
a claim petition for compensation to the Department of Labor and Industry, if the
employer and employee or the insurer and the employee fail to agree upon the facts
of the work-related injury or upon the compensation due under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. Id. § 751.
3. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1083. A claimant is paid total disability benefits when
it is proved that the claimant is "unable to compete for employment on the open
labor market." ALEXANDER F. BARBIERI, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AND OCCUPATIONAL DIsEAsE § 5.14 at 38 (1975). A claimant is also paid total dis-
ability benefits when the claimant proves an inability to perform his pre-injury du-
ties coupled with the employer's subsequent inability, after the burden of proof shifts
to the employer, to prove the availability of light work which the claimant is capa-
ble of performing. See Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 246 A.2d 668, 674 (Pa. 1968).
Total disability is not defined in the Act, but the Act does provide that an employee
is entitled to 66.67% the employee's wages, as defined under section 309 of the Act,
for total disability. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 511. If, after calculating the benefit in
the above manner, the benefit is less than 50% of the statewide average weekly
wage, then the benefit that is payable is calculated to be the lower of 50% of the
statewide average weekly wage or 90% of the claimant's average weekly wage. Id.
4. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1083. A light-duty job is a position within the
claimant's medical restrictions. See General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
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benefits were accordingly modified to reflect partial disability.5
Thereafter, benefits were paid to the Appellant according to
various supplemental agreements." The final supplemental
agreement provided that the Appellant was entitled to partial
disability compensation for a fixed three-month period.7 Prior to
the expiration of the final supplemental agreement, the work
force at Latrobe Die Casting Company went on strike.8 After
the strike, the Employer reduced the work force and the
Appellant's employment was terminated due to his lack of se-
niority.9
The Appellant then filed a petition to reinstate his benefits as
of the date the strike commenced.10 The referee" held that the
Appellant had not sustained his burden of proving that he was
absent from work due to a work-related injury.12 As a result,
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Shnipes), 631 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993). A light-duty position has also been described as a position specially creat-
ed by the employer which is light of effort and responsibility as well as laden with
rest and comfort. See BARaIERI, cited at note 3, § 5.14(1) at 39.
5. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1083. A claimant, receiving total disability compensa-
tion, who returns to work in a light-duty capacity, will have his benefits modified to
reflect the change in earning power. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512. Partial dis-
ability includes any disability which is less than total disability and is measured by
loss of earning power. Id. Partial disability benefits are paid at a rate equal to
66.67% of the difference between the wages of the injured claimant, as provided by
section 309 of the Act and the earning power of the claimant subsequent to the
injury. Id.
6. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1083. A supplemental agreement is an agreement be-
tween the parties, as to modification of benefits, relating to the claimant's change in
compensation status. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 732.
7. Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting
Company), 510 A.2d 896, 897 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 522 A.2d
1106 (1987). According to the final supplemental agreement, the Appellant was enti-
tled to partial disability compensation between September 4, 1979 and December 4,
1979. Latta, 510 A.2d at 897.
The final supplemental agreement also provided that the Appellant's compen-
sation benefits would be effectively suspended at the end of the fixed three-month
period as a result of an "undetermined partial disability not reflected in the loss of
wage." Latta, 510 A.2d at 897. An employer may suspend compensation when an
employee has returned to work at his prior or increased earnings, whereby the
employee's disability would not be reflected in the loss of wage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 774.2.
8. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The Appellant and his fellow employees went on
strike on October 20, 1979. Id.
9. Id. The duration of the Appellant's employment was not mentioned in the
opinion.
10. Id. A claimant may petition to reinstate benefits, previously under suspen-
sion, where the claimant's earning power is once again adversely affected by the
disability. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772.
11. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The referee, now called a Workers' Compensation
Judge for the Department of Labor and Industry, is appointed by the Secretary of
Labor and Industry to hold departmental hearings under the Workers' Compensation
Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 701.
12. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The referee noted that initially the Appellant had
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the referee denied the Appellant's reinstatement petition and his
benefits remained suspended.'" The Appellant then appealed
the referee's adverse order to the Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (the "Board"). 4
The Board, in affirming the decision of the referee, held that
the Appellant had not proven that he had any disability attrib-
utable to a work-related injury.5 The Board asserted that the
Appellant could not satisfy his burden of proof by simply show-
ing that he was no longer working." Subsequently, the Appel-
lant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 7
which affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the
Board. 8 The commonwealth court reversed the Board's decision
and allowed disability benefits with respect to the time period
already covered by the final supplemental agreement, however,
the commonwealth court affirmed the Board's decision and de-
nied disability benefits with respect to the time period subse-
quent to the expiration of the final supplemental agreement.'
The Appellant's petition for allocatur was then denied by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.20
The Appellant filed a second reinstatement petition alleging
that he was entitled to total disability benefits beginning Janu-
ary 5, 1980."' The Appellant's physician testified that the Ap-
voluntarily removed himself from employment by participating in the strike and
subsequently was not employed due to the reduction in the work force. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is a departmental adminis-
trative board which acts as an appellate board independent of the Secretary of La-
bor and Industry and any other official of the Department of Labor and Industry.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 701. Referees' decisions are appealed to the Board. id.
§ 853.
15. Opinion, Latta v. Latrobe Die Casting Co., A-85914, W.C.A.B. (1984).
16. Id.
17. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. Decisions of the Board are appealed to the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871. The commonwealth
court has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of commonwealth agen-
cies having statewide jurisdiction. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763 (1981 & Supp. 1994).
18. Latta, 510 A.2d at 899.
19. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The commonwealth court held that the Appellant
had carried his burden of proving continuing disability with respect to the time pe-
riod from October 20, 1979 until December 4, 1979, due to the fact that the final
supplemental agreement covered this period. Latta, 510 A.2d at 898. The common-
wealth court further held that the Appellant had not met his burden of proving
continuing disability for the period after December 4, 1979, the end of the supple-
mental agreement. Id. at 899.
20. 522 A.2d 1108 (Pa. 1987). Allocatur is an allowance of an appeal for con-
sideration. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990). Decisions of the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania are appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 724.
21. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The second petition was filed on March 27, 1987.
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pellant could not perform his pre-injury employment duties;
however, the examining physician concluded that the Appellant
could perform light-duty work as was previously determined by
the same physician shortly after the work-related injury.2"
The referee held that the Appellant met his burden of proving
his inability to continue working in his pre-injury capacity as of
June 10, 1987.2 However, any claim for benefits prior to the
June 10, 1987 examination was precluded because that claim
had previously been litigated.'" The Board affirmed the
referee's decision." On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania also affirmed."'
The commonwealth court determined that prior decisions in
this case controlled the period from January 2, 1980 to March 3,
1983, but did not control the period between the date the record
was closed and the date of the Appellant's last physical exami-
nation." The commonwealth court further determined that the
Id. The court noted that there was no indication in the record as to why the date of
January 5, 1980 was chosen, because the record reflected that December 4, 1979
would have been more proper. Id. at 1084 n.3. The final supplemental agreement
was to conclude as of December 4, 1979. Latta, 510 A.2d at 897.
In the hearing before the referee, the Appellant presented his own testimony
as well as the deposition testimony of an expert medical witness who examined the
Appellant twice. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The first examination of the Appellant was
on September 12, 1980, three years after the work-related injury occurred. Id. The
other examination of the Appellant took place on June 10, 1987. Id. The second
examination occurred after the first hearing in which the referee held that the
Appellant's benefits could not be reinstated because the Appellant lacked the un-
equivocal medical evidence necessary to support a reinstatement. Id. This evidence
was not presented at the first hearing regarding the reinstatement petition. Latta v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 616 A.2d 1110,
1112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 642 A.2d 1083 (1994).
22. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The Appellants physician determined that his
work-related injury had continued as of the date of his most recent physical exami-
nation, June 10, 1987. Id. The date of June 10, 1987 is particularly significant due
to the fact that the Appellant was examined by his physician to prove the continua-
tion of his work-related injury and the examination took place subsequent to the
previous adverse determination of the referee.
23. Id.
24. Id. The commonwealth court also noted that res judicata would preclude
matters that had been or could have been litigated in prior proceedings. Latta, 616
A.2d at 1112. Res judicata is "[tihe rule that a final judgment rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent ac-
tion involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1305 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084. The commonwealth court held that the claimant
had to produce unequivocal medical testimony to establish that a work-related injury
continued. Latta, 616 A.2d at 1112 (citing Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments
Division, 584 A.2d 301, 303 (Pa. 1990)).
26. Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.),
616 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), reu'd, 642 A.2d 1083 (1994).
27. Latta, 616 A.2d at 1112, The record was closed on March 3, 1983 and the
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Appellant was unable to carry his burden with respect to the
period between the date the record was closed and his last ex-
amination. s Because the Appellant failed to present unequivo-
cal expert medical evidence to support his allegation of a contin-
uing work-related injury, the commonwealth court concluded
that he failed to satisfy the burden of proof with respect to this
later period."
The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia, and the supreme court granted allocatur.0 The issue be-
fore the supreme court was whether a claimant seeking rein-
statement of suspended benefits had to present expert medical
evidence which established that the original work-related injury
continued."'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania3 2 agreed with the com-
monwealth court's determination that the Appellant's expert
medical evidence only supported a finding that his work-related
injury continued as of the date of his most recent physical exam-
ination." However, the supreme court disagreed with the com-
monwealth court's finding that the Appellant was unable to
satisfy his burden of proof with respect to the time period from
the date the record closed to the date of the Appellant's last
physical examination.'
Appellant's last physical examination was on June 10, 1987. Id. The commonwealth
court noted that res judicata was applicable until the date the record was closed. Id.
The court determined that its earlier decision was controlling with respect to the
time period-from January 2, 1980 to March 3, 1983 due to the doctrine of res judi-
cata. Id. (citing Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Cast-
ing Co.), 510 A.2d 896 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)).
28. Latta, 616 A.2d at 1112.
29. Id.
30. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084.
31. Id. at 1083.
32. Justice Cappy wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania. Id. Justice Zappala authored a concurring opinion. Id. at 1085.
33. Id. at 1084.
34. Id. The supreme court focused considerable attention on its prior decision
in Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division. Id. (citing Pieper v. Ametek-
Thermox Instruments Division, 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990)). In Pieper, the court deter-
mined that, due to the nature of a suspension of benefits, a reduced burden of proof
existed when a claimant sought reinstatement of benefits. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084
(quoting Pieper, 584 A.2d at 304-05). Furthermore, the court in Pieper held that
causation would be presumed when a claimant, who had previously established a
work-related injury supporting a finding of disability, sought reinstatement of sus-
pended benefits, if the claimant could demonstrate that: (1) through no fault of his
own, his earning power was once again adversely affected by his disability; and (2)
the disability which gave rise to his original claim, in fact, continued. Pieper, 584
A.2d at 301.
The supreme court noted that the commonwealth court had improperly relied
on Pieper. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084-85. Most notably, the court asserted that while
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The court noted that a suspension of workers' compensation
benefits indicated that a work-related injury continued, but that
the claimant's earning power was not currently affected."5
Therefore, the court explained that a claimant could satisfy his
burden of proof by simply testifying that his work-related injury
continued."5 The court noted that once a claimant testified that
the work-related injury continued, the burden then shifted to
the employer to prove the contrary.37 The court asserted that
when the employer failed to present such evidence, the
claimant's testimony, if believed by the referee, would be suffi-
cient to reinstate the suspended benefits."
Therefore, the supreme court reversed the decision of the
commonwealth court and held that expert medical evidence was
not required to establish that a prior work-related injury persist-
ed. 9 During the hearing before the referee, the Appellant had
testified that his injury continued from the date the record
closed until the date of his last examination.4 The court noted
that the Appellant's testimony, if believed by the referee, was
sufficient to support a finding that his injury continued.41 Once
the Appellant testified as to his condition, the burden then shift-
ed to the employer to prove that the injury had ceased.' The
court contended that no evidence was presented on behalf of the
Employer to disprove the continuation of the work-related inju-
ry.' As a result, the Appellant's testimony, if believed by the
referee, would be sufficient to support reinstatement of his bene-
fits for the period in question." Accordingly, the court reversed
the decision of the commonwealth court, vacated the order of the
Board, and remanded the matter to the referee to make findings
expert medical evidence was offered in Pieper, its mere presence did not imply that
such evidence was required to establish that a work-related injury, in fact, contin-
ued. Id. at 1085.
35. Id. Compensation is not payable when there is no loss of earning power.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512.
36. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085. The court asserted that to hold otherwise would





41. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085. The commonwealth court would have required the
Appellant to corroborate his own subjective assessment of his condition with an
expert medical opinion. See Latta, 616 A.2d at 1112.
42. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085. The opinion did not state whether the Employer






as to whether Appellant's testimony was believable.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Zappala remarked that on
remand the Employer should be given an opportunity to intro-
duce evidence to rebut the Appellant's testimony.' The concur-
rence asserted that it would be unjust to allow reinstatement
based on the Appellant's testimony alone.47 Justice Zappala
noted that at the time of the hearing before the referee the em-
ployer was not required to introduce such evidence.'
In 1915, the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to au-
thorize the Pennsylvania General Assembly to enact laws to
require employers to pay reasonable compensation for injuries to
employees that arose in the course of their employment. 9 Com-
pensation was to be paid regardless of the fault of the employer
or employee."0 The Workmen's Compensation Act, originally
enacted in Pennsylvania in 1915, eliminated the employee's
common law tort cause of action against the employer for alleged
work-related injuries.51 The Act represented a compromise, in
that, employees gave up their right to bring a civil action
against the employer and the employer gave up the right to
raise such affirmative defenses as the employee's potential con-
tributory negligence or assumption of the risk."
The term "suspension" was not used in the original
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915.' Section 426 of the Act
of 1915 provided that an agreement or award could be modified
or terminated by the Board when the incapacity or disability of
the claimant had changed.' The suspension of compensation
45. Id.
46. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring).
47. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085 (Zappala, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1085-86.
49. PA. CONST. of 1874, art III., § 21 (1915).
50. Id.
51. 1915 Pa. Laws 338.
52. See David B. Torrey, Time Limitations in the Pennsylvania Worknen's
Compensation Act and Occupational Disease Acts: Theoretical Doctrine and Current
Applications, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 975, 978 (1986).
53. See Holtz v. McGraw & Bindley, 54 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1947).
54. 1915 Pa. Laws 338, § 426 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 426 (1915),
amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 413 (1992)). Section 426 of the Act of 1915
provided:
Any agreement or award of compensation may be modified or terminated at
any time by a subsequent agreement approved by the Board, and may be
modified or terminated by the Board or a referee designated by the Board, on
petition of either party, on the ground that the incapacity of the injured em-
ploye has subsequently increased, decreased, or terminated, or the status of
any dependent has changed.
1915 Pa. Laws 338, § 426. However, no legislative provision existed that provided
for the suspension of compensation payments. See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 906-07.
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payments began as an administrative practice of the Board
when the claimant returned to light work at equivalent wag-
es." A Board rule" provided that where the claimant's physi-
cal impairment was not currently reflected in any ,loss of earning
power, compensation would be suspended rather than terminat-
ed. 7 The 1919 amendments to the Act included a provision that
allowed the Board the power to modify, reinstate, suspend, or
terminate benefits."8
In 1939, the Act was once again amended and reenacted."9
The legislature amended the Act to prevent the receipt of com-
pensation benefits while the employee was receiving equivalent
wages.60 The first case to address the issue of whether the
55. See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 907.
56. The Act of July 21, 1919 provided that, "[it shall be the duty of the
board to make all proper and necessary rules and regulations." 1919 Pa. Laws 441,
§ 16.
57. See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 907.
58. 1919 Pa. Laws 277, § 413. Section 413 of the Act in 1919 provided:
The board, or referee designated by the board, may, at any time, modify,
reinstate, suspend, or terminate an original or supplemental agreement or an
award, upon petition filed by either party with such board . .. shall suspend
the payment of compensation fixed in the agreement or by the award, in
whole or to such extent as the facts alleged in the petition would, if proved,
require.
Id.
The 1939 amendment to the Act preserved the exact wording of the 1919
amendment of section 413 of the Act. Holtz, 54 A.2d at 907. The portion of section
413 of the Act which authorizes the Board to "modify, reinstate, suspend, or termi-
nate" has not been changed by any amendments since 1919. Id. Workers' compensa-
tion laws are frequently amended to be reasonably effective and responsive to cur-
rent needs. See BA"IERI, cited at note 3, § 2.02 at 5.
The addition of the word "suspension" to section 413 was a manifestation of
the legislature's intent that a suspension is different from a termination. See Holtz,
54 A.2d at 907. The Holtz court did not rely on any authority for this assertion.
Rather, it was their own interpretation of legislative intent based on the wording of
section 413 of the Act.
59. 1939 Pa. Laws 281.
60. See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 908. The 1939 amendments altered section 306 of
the Act and essentially adopted the Board's theory previously advanced by Board
rule number 27. See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 908. Section 306 of the Act now reads:
For disability partial in character ... sixty-six and two thirds per centum of
the difference between the wages of the injured employe, as defined in [PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 582], and the earning power of the employe thereaf-
ter .... The term "earning power," as used in this section, shall in no case
be less than the weekly amount which the employe receives after the inju.
ry ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512 (the 1939 amendment is in italics).
The amendment and reenactment of 1939 did not change the Board's power.
See Holtz, 54 A.2d at 908.
In 1972, the Act was again amended. See 1972 Pa. Laws 61. The 1972
amendment to the Act consisted of major legislative changes including entirely new
procedural and administrative measures. BARBIERI, cited at note 3, §, 2.02 at 5. The
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Board could suspend the claimant's award when the claimant
was receiving equivalent wages was Weinstock v. United Cigar
Stores Co.6'
In Weinstock, the claimant was injured while supervising a
picnic given by his employer. 2 Upon returning to work, the
claimant required an assistant to perform his duties; however,
the claimant's wages actually increased after the work-related
injury.' The court reasoned that earning power was to be de-
termined by looking at a variety of factors, including wages
actually received.6 The court noted that part of the wages paid
to the claimant were in appreciation for past services for the
employer and, in that sense, were gratuitous and not earned as
salary.' Therefore, the court in Weinstock concluded that the
claimant was entitled to receive compensation, notwithstanding
the fact that he was also receiving equivalent wages." The
1972 amendments have been considered the "most sweeping and most radically out
of line with prior amendments." Id. Not only did this amendment eliminate the need
for an accident, it also provided for many increases in substantive benefits. Id. Yet,
the 1972 amendment to the Act did not change the relevant portions of sections 306
and 413 of the Act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 77, § 772.
61. 8 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939). See also Chubb v. Allegheny Country
Club, 24 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942); Johnston v. Butler Ry. Co., 27 A.2d 785
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
62. Weinstock, 8 A.2d at 800. The claimant fractured the upper part of his left
leg and was unable to return to work for approximately five months. Id.
63. Id. The opinion does not mention why the claimant's wages were in-
creased.
64. Id. at 801 (quoting Bispels v. Shoemaker, 2 A.2d 35, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1938)). The court in Bispela stated:
Earning power is to be determined not only by taking into account the actual
amount of wages an employee receives following an injury, but also by consid-
ering the other elements affecting his earning power. Such elements include
(1) the character and extent of his physical injury or disability; (2) his produc-
tivity or efficiency in the same employment as compared to what it was imme-
diately prior to the injury; and (3) his ability to earn wages in any kind of
employment for which he is fitted.
Bispels, 2 A.2d at 36.
65. Weinstock, 8 A.2d at 801.
66. Id. Although the court did not invoke any specific section of the Act, the
section applicable to this case was section 306. Section 306 provides that:
Sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the difference between the wages of an
injured employe . . . and the earning power of an employe therefore . . . The
term "earning power", as used in this section, shall in no case be less than
the weekly amount which the employs receives after the accident.
1939 Pa. Laws 281, § 306.
The Weinstock court relied on Cavanaugh v. Luckenbach S.S. Co. for the
proposition that earnings of a claimant after the accident were but evidence of a
change in earning power and that the earnings were not conclusive on the matter.
Weinstock, 8 A.2d at 801 (quoting Cavanaugh v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 189 A. 789,
791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937)).
The Weinstock court also relied on Bispels v. Shoemaker for the proposition
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court further concluded that the claimant's salary was not re-
duced to reflect the loss of earning power. 7 The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania therefore determined that the simultaneous re-
ceipt of equivalent wages and compensation benefits was permis-
sible."
The issue of whether the Board could suspend compensation
benefits until the claimant lost earning power arose again in
Scipani v. Pressed Steel Car Co.69 In Scipani, the claimant in-
jured his hand while in the scope of his employment, but re-
turned to work at wages that were not less than his pre-injury
wages." The court asserted that the 1939 amendments to sec-
tion 306 and section 403 of the Act referred to the actual
amount of wages received subsequent to the injury." The supe-
rior court determined that the 1939 amendments directed that
no compensation was payable when an employee, subsequent to
the injury, received wages equal to the pre-injury wages."
that earning power was to be determined by considering a variety of elements affect-
ing earning power, not only the actual amount of earnings received subsequent to
the injury. Weinstock, 8 A.2d at 801 (quoting Bispels, 2 A.2d at 36).
67. Weinstock, 8 A.2d at 801.
68. Id. at 800.
69. 28 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942).
70. Scipani, 28 A.2d at 503-04. This occurred even though the court deter-
mined that the claimant was partially disabled. Id.
In the accident, the bones of the claimant's thumb and middle finger were
fractured. Id. at 503. The claimant also lacerated two fingers and the palm of his
hand. Id. The result of the accident was limited flexion of the thumb, index, and
middle fingers. Id. According to medical testimony, the claimant suffered a loss of
approximately one-third of the efficiency of his right hand. Id.
71. Id. at 504. See note 60 for the text of section 306. See note 58 for the
text of section 413.
72. Scipani, 28 A.2d at 504. The court further held that it was error to sus-
pend payments where the claimant's loss of earnings was caused by economic con-
ditions and other matters not related to the claimant's physical impairment. Id. The
court was referring to weather conditions and reductions in the employer's work
force due to economic reasons. Id. Furthermore, it was apparent that when a claim-
ant was disabled, economic matters or other matters not related to the claimant's
physical impairment could cause the claimant's disability to subsequently be reflected
in loss of earning power so as to prevent continued suspension of benefits. Id. A
claimant who was partially disabled and returned to work in a light-duty capacity
might not have had his disability reflected in a loss of earning power due to the
fact that the claimant was receiving wages equivalent to his pre-injury wages. Id.
Therefore, it was possible that a downturn in the economy (i.e. an economic matter
or a matter not related to the claimant's physical impairment) could cause the em-
ployer to eliminate the claimant's position in reducing its work force. Id. As a result,
the claimant's current wages would fall below his pre-injury wages. Id. Such a re-
duction in wages caused the claimant's disability to be reflected in the claimant's
loss of earning power. Id. When the claimant's current earnings were less than the
claimant's pre-injury wage, there could be no suspension of compensation benefits.
Holtz, 54 A.2d at 909. Further, when a suspension could not be effectuated, the
original agreement or award was reinstated and remained in effect, subject only to
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Thus, the court in Scipani established that the 1939 amend-
ments to section 306 and section 413 prevented the simulta-
neous receipt of compensation benefits and post-injury wages
that were equivalent to pre-injury wages.7"
The original rule regarding the burden of proof in workers'
compensation cases was first announced by the superior court in
Consona v. Coulborn & Co. (Royal Indemnity Co.).74  In
Consona, the issue was whether proof of job availability was
necessary when the claimant could perform light work.75 The
claimant was injured in the course of his employment when a
block hit him in the head.7" Due to the fact that the claimant
could only perform light work at irregular intervals, the court
determined that it would not be practicable to expect that he
could hold a job, and no evidence of job availability was offered
to the referee by either party.77 Therefore, the court upheld the
Board's decision concluding that the claimant was totally dis-
abled." In so holding, the court asserted that where a claimant
was able to perform light work, "it might be presumed that work
of that nature would be available."79 Thus, the Consona court
contended that the burden of proof was on the claimant when
the claimant was able to perform light work.0
modification upon a showing of change in disability or earning power. Id.
Thus, the legislature and the courts devised a new compensation status,
termed "suspension." See Appellant's Brief at 10, Latta v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.), 642 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 1994) (No. 0032 W.C.).
The suspension status is measured in terms of earnings instead of earning power
and its effect is to cause the discontinuance of compensation payments because of
changes in post-injury wages, not because of changes in disability. Appellant's Brief
at 10.
73. Scipani, 28 A.2d at 503-04. The Act was again amended in 1945, with no
changes or amendments to the relevant portions of section 306 or section 413. See
Holtz, 54 A.2d at 908. The relevant portions of section 306 and section 413 currently
remain in effect. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 512, 772.
74. 158 A. 300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
75. Consona, 158 A. at 300-01.
76. Id. The claimant's injuries consisted of a fractured skull, jaw, and nose as
well as lacerations and a badly bruised shoulder. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 300.
80. Consona, 158 A. at 300. The identical issue of whether proof of job avail-
ability was necessary when it was established that the claimant was able to perform
light work was decided in Earley v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. See
Earley v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 19 A.2d 615 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1941). In Earley, the claimant sustained a work-related injury when a coal chute hit
him. Earley, 19 A.2d at 615. The claimant fractured the first lumbar vertebra in the
accident. Id. The court reasoned that when a claimant suffered a work-related injury
and remained able to perform light work there was a presumption of job availability.
Id. at 617. The superior court held that the burden of proof was on the claimant to
prove that no such light work existed which the claimant, considering the claimant's
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In Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co.,"1 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania addressed the issue of whether a claimant was entitled
to compensation for total disability where he could adequately
perform light-duty work and where no evidence was presented
that light work was available."2 In Petrone, the claimant provid-
ed medical evidence establishing that he could no longer perform
his pre-injury duties.' However, no evidence was presented
that demonstrated the availability of any light work that the
claimant could perform." The court determined that it was eas-
ier for the employer to prove that such light work existed than
for the claimant to prove its non-existence."
The Petrone court noted that the presumption of job availabili-
ty for claimants who were able to perform light work, created by
the Consona and Earley decisions, was unnatural and illogi-
cal.8" The court held that once a claimant proved that the
claimant's pre-injury work could not be performed, the burden of
proof shifted to the employer to prove the existence of light work
which the claimant could perform.87 The court further opined
that if an employer could not satisfy the requisite burden, the
claimant was entitled to compensation benefits for total disabili-
ty." Thus, the Petrone court placed the burden of proving job
availability on the employer. 9
In Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co.," the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania addressed the issue of whether the Petrone decision
should be extended to place the burden of proving the availabili-
ty of any type of work on the employer.91 In Barrett, the claim-
ant was injured as a result of an accident that occurred in the
education and experience, could perform. Id. Thus, the Earley court extended the
Consona rule to a definite presumption that light work was available and that the
claimant could procure such work. Id.
81. 233 A.2d 891 (Pa. 1967).
82. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 892. The Petrone court also noted that the claimant's
educational and vocational background were at issue when considering whether the
claimant was entitled to benefits while he could adequately perform light work, but
no evidence of job availability was presented. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 894-95. The claimant was diagnosed with having anthracosilicosis
which was common among coal miners. Id. at 892. The claimant's examining physi-
cian concluded that the claimant could no longer work in the coal mines or compete
in the general labor market, but he could perform light-duty work of a general na-
ture. id.
85. Id. at 895.
86. Id. at 894.
87. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 895.
88. Id. at 895.
89, Id. at 894-95.
90. 246 A.2d 668 (Pa. 1968).
91. Barrett, 246 A.2d at 671.
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course of his employment.' After considering the conflicting
testimony of four medical doctors, the Board found the claimant
to be partially disabled.' The claimant, on appeal, argued that
the finding of partial disability should not be sustained due to
the absence of evidence as to the availability of work within the
claimant's physical limitations." The issue was whether the
employer had the burden of proving that work existed that the
claimant could perform in order to sustain the finding of partial
disability. 5 The court held that once a claimant proved the in-
ability to return to pre-injury work, the employer had the bur-
den of proving that other work was available which the claimant
was capable of obtaining."
In shifting the burden, the Barrett court relied on the proposi-
tion that the burden of proof could be placed on the party trying
to prove the existence of a fact instead of on the party trying to
prove its non-existence.97 The Barrett court also noted that it
was more difficult to prove that no jobs were available than to
prove that a job was available." The court further observed
that by placing the burden on the employer, agreements be-
tween employers and employees who suffered temporary total
disability would become more attractive." The Barrett decision
extended the Petrone decision and placed the burden of proving
the availability of any type of work on the employer.' 0
In Cerny v. Schrader & Seyfried, Inc.," the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania established the burden of proof that was re-
quired of a claimant in a modification proceeding.' After in-
curring a work-related injury which prevented the claimant from
returning to his old position, the claimant returned to work in a
light-duty position."a At the end of the partial disability pay-
ment period, the claimant petitioned to modify his compensation
benefits from partial disability to total disability." The Board,
92. Id. at 669.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 671.
95. Id.
96. Barrett, 246 A.2d at 674.
97. Id. at 673 (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
2486 (1940)).
98. Barrett, 246 A.2d at 673.
99. Id. at 674.
100. Id. The case was remanded to the Board for a hearing and findings pursu-
ant to the burden of proof as defined by the supreme court in that opinion. Id.
101. 342 A.2d 384 (Pa. 1975).
102. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 385.
103. Id. A sewer trench in which the claimant was working collapsed upon him.
ld. However, after returning to work, the claimant was subsequently laid off. Id.
The court did not indicate why the claimant was laid off.
104. Id. The claimant petitioned for modification under Section 413 of the Act.
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relying on Barrett, awarded the claimant total disability because
the employer had failed to prove light work was available which
the claimant was capable of performing."5 The commonwealth
court reversed the Board's decision and held that the claimant
had failed to establish an increase in disability. 106
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the order of the
commonwealth court, and held that the same allocations of bur-
dens of proof as set forth in Petrone and Barrett should apply to
modification proceedings. 1"7 The court asserted that when a
claimant alleged total disability in a modification proceeding, the
claimant had to prove both an increase in disability and an
inability to perform his previous employment duties.'l" The
court in Cerny concluded that medical proof of a change in dis-
ability was required to modify an award or supplemental agree-
ment."9 The court determined that if the employee met this
burden, the burden of proof then shifted to the employer."
The court asserted that a finding of total disability would be
warranted unless the employer established that work was avail-
able that the claimant could perform."'
The issue of whether medical proof regarding changes in dis-
ability was necessary in a reinstatement proceeding was ad-
dressed by the commonwealth court in Busche v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board (Townsend & Bottum, Inc.)."' In
Busche, the claimant was awarded total disability for a heart
attack, but subsequently returned to work in a light-duty capaci-
ty, which resulted in a suspension of benefits."' The claimant's
Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772.
105. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 386.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 386-87.
108. Id. at 387. In so holding, the Cerny court relied on section 413 of the Act
and on the decisions in Barrett and Petrone. Id. at 386.
109. Id. at 386-87. Because neither the referee nor the Board had determined
whether the claimant had established an increase in his disability (at each level the
determination was made based upon the availability of light work), the supreme
court vacated the order of the commonwealth court and remanded the case to the
Board to determine whether an increase in the claimant's disability had been estab-
lished. Id. at 387.
110. Cerny, 342 A.2d at 387.
111. Id.
112. 466 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). See also Venanzio v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Eastern Express), 489 A.2d 284 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985); Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Futura Indus-
tries), 471 A.2d 1304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
113. Busche, 466 A.2d at 278-79. The claimant suffered the heart attack when
lifting heavy cylinders weighing approximately one hundred and fifty pounds. Id. at
278. As a result of the heart attack, the claimant underwent coronary bypass sur-
gery. Id. Although the claimant remained disabled, he returned to work in a light-
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light-duty job was subsequently eliminated by the employer,
without finding other employment for the claimant."4
The commonwealth court asserted that the claimant's only
burden in a reinstatement proceeding was to prove that the
specially created position had been discontinued." 5 Thus, the
court reasoned that the claimant simply had to show that his
disability had continued and a loss of earnings had recurred."'
The court held that medical proof of a change in disability was
not necessary in a reinstatement proceeding."
7
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of
the evidence necessary to support a petition for reinstatement of
benefits in Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division.""
In Pieper, the claimant suffered a lower back injury during the
course of his employment."" The claimant's benefits were sub-
sequently suspended upon his return to full-time employ-
ment. 2 ' While the claimant's benefits were under suspension,
the claimant was laid off and, therefore, petitioned for reinstate-
ment of his benefits.'2 ' The referee found that the claimant
was totally and permanently disabled and reinstated his com-
pensation benefits."2 The Board found that the referee's deci-
sion was supported by competent evidence.2 The Common-
duty position created for him by the employer. Id. The claimant's compensation pay-
ments were suspended upon his return to work. Id.
114. Id. at 279.
115. Id. at 280.
116. Id. at 281.
117. Id. at 280. The commonwealth court reversed the Board and remanded for
an order reinstating compensation payments. Id. at 280-81.
118. 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990). The court reviews a board order to determine
whether there has been a constitutional violation, an error of law, or a violation of
procedure, and whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 303 (quoting 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (Supp. 1994)).
119. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 302. The claimant was paid temporary total disability
benefits for a herniated disk until he returned to work and executed a "final re-
ceipt." Id. The claimant then suffered a recurrence of the injury and his compensa-
tion benefits were reinstated by a supplemental agreement. Id. The claimant then
returned to work on a part-time basis, receiving partial disability benefits. Id.
120. Id. The claimant petitioned for reinstatement of benefits which were previ-
ously "terminated" by a supplemental agreement, because he returned to full-time
work. Id. at 305.
121. Id. at 302. The claimant received unemployment compensation benefits for
twenty-six weeks. Id. During the time the claimant was receiving unemployment
benefits, he did not receive worker's compensation benefits. Id.
122. Id. at 303.
123. Id. The Board found that the referee's decision was supported by compe-
tent evidence based upon the following: (1) the claimant's testimony; (2) the supple-
mental agreements; (3) the claimant's back operation to improve his disability; and
(4) the testimony of the claimant's treating physician. Id. The Board recognized that
the testimony of the claimant's physician concerned the continuation of the
claimant's work-related injury rather than its causation. Id. However, the Board
1995
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wealth Court of Pennsylvania then reversed the decision of the
Board.
2 14
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that to
reinstate suspended benefits, the claimant was only required to
show that the reasons for the suspension no longer existed.'25
The court asserted that the claimant had sufficiently estab-
lished, by medical testimony, that his disability continued. 2'
The supreme court concluded that the testimony of the
claimant's examining physician was sufficient to establish the
continuation of the claimant's work-related injury, and asserted
that, in the absence of evidence of availability of other employ-
ment, the claimant was entitled to have his suspension lifted,
thereby reversing the commonwealth court. 2 '
In addressing the issue of whether a claimant seeking rein-
statement of suspended benefits was required to present expert
medical evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Latta,
concluded that such evidence was not necessary to support a
reinstatement of benefits. 2 ' The Latta court held that after a
claimant testified that the work-related injury continued, the
found that the evidence in its entirety was adequate to support the referee's decision
to reinstate benefits. Id.
124. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 303. The commonwealth court held that the necessary
finding of causation was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. The common-
wealth court, therefore, applied the standard corresponding to a termination of bene-
fits. Id. at 305. The claimant was required to show that there was a causal connec-
tion between the work-related injury and his present disability. Id. at 305-06.
125. Id. at 304. The supreme court noted that many months or years could
pass before an economic condition would force a claimant to apply for reinstatement
of benefits. Id. at 305. Therefore, in order for the claimant to prove that the reasons
for.the suspension no longer existed, the claimant was required to prove that his
earning power was once again adversely affected by his disability through no fault of
his own. Id. Furthermore, the claimant was required to prove that the original dis-
ability continued. Id.
126. Id. at 308. The claimant was also found to have established that his earn-
ing power was once again adversely affected by his disability due to the fact that
the claimant was no longer receiving unemployment compensation. Id. Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the decision of the commonwealth court and reinstated the
decision of the Board, which reinstated the claimant's benefits. Id.
127. Id. at 306. See note 36 for a discussion of the Latta court's interpretation
of this proposition. The supreme court also noted that the claimant's benefits were
suspended and, therefore concluded that the commonwealth court committed an error
of law in applying the standard for termination of benefits rather than the standard
for a suspension of benefits. Id. The Pieper court noted that the causal connection
between the original work-related injury and the claimant's disability was presumed
when a claimant petitioned for reinstatement of suspended benefits. Id. at 305.
Thus, the claimant was only required to show that his disability continued and his
loss of earnings recurred. Id. The Pieper court relied, in part, upon the Busche deci-
sion for this proposition. Id. See notes 112-17 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Busche decision.
128. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1083.
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burden shifted to the employer to prove the contrary.' The
court's decision evolved, in part, from the decisions in Busche
and Pieper.
Pursuant to the persuasive authority of Busche, Pieper and
Latta, a claimant seeking to reinstate benefits, currently under
suspension, has the burden to show, by the claimant's testimony
alone, that the claimant's disability, in fact, continues."30 Once
the claimant effectively demonstrates that the disability contin-
ues, the burden of proof is then shifted to the employer to prove
the contrary.'3' When an employer fails to prove that the
claimant's work-related injury has not continued, the claimant's
testimony alone is sufficient to support reinstatement of the
suspended benefits.132
The importance of this decision is clear. By removing the
burden of establishing the continuance of a work-related injury
by introducing medical evidence, the supreme court has opened
the door to many more claimants who previously would not have
been able to satisfy the heavy burden. Further, by placing the
burden of proof on the employer, the supreme court has effec-
tively encouraged an increase in the use of supplemental agree-
ments.
Although a suspension status acknowledges a continuing
work-related injury, the claimant's benefits are suspended be-
cause the claimant's earning power is not currently affected by
the injury. 3 A claimant who is currently under a suspension
status has already established a work-related injury which
would support an award of workers' compensation benefits. To
hold that a claimant needs to prove the continuation of the
work-related injury by providing expert medical evidence would
require a claimant to re-establish a proposition which has al-
ready been established, agreed to, and acknowledged.
The Latta decision is equitable to the claimant.'3 First, a
claimant would shoulder a heavy financial burden if the claim-
ant were required to present expert medical evidence of the
continuation of the work-related injury. Not only would the
claimant have to incur expenses for an examination by a physi-
cian and the physician's preparation of a report, the claimant
129. Id.




134. The Workers' Compensation Act is remedial in nature and was intended to
be liberally construed so as to effectuate the basic social and remedial purposes of
the Act. BARBIERI, cited at note 3, § 2.08 at 11.
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would also have to pay for the deposition testimony of the exam-
ining physician, which is often far more expensive than the
exam and report. Second, it would appear that employers are in
a better financial position to assume this cost. Finally, placing
the burden to prove the non-existence of the work-related injury
on the employer eliminates the employer's incentive to contest
the reinstatement of the claimant's benefits where the employer
anticipated the financial inability of the claimant to provide the
necessary evidence, thereby making supplemental agreements
more attractive.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania provided a safeguard to
the employer by requiring that the claimant's testimony must be
believed by the referee.'35 Therefore, credibility plays an inte-
gral role in the reinstatement process. In fact, an employer may
not even need to present evidence if the referee does not believe
the claimant's testimony. 36
The Latta decision, however, becomes more unfavorable to the
employer with the passage of time between the initial suspen-
sion and subsequent reinstatement. Where a short period of
time elapses between the suspension and reinstatement, deter-
mining whether the injury has continued would be straightfor-
ward.137 However, the longer the passage of time between the
suspension and reinstatement, the less obvious it is that the
injury has continued.138 When a significant amount of time
elapses between the suspension and reinstatement, shifting the
burden of proof to the employer may be unfair.
The supreme court's holding in Latta will most likely be modi-
fied or limited in application to address the problems presented
with the increased passage of time between the suspension and
reinstatement. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in both
Latta and Pieper, acknowledged the increasingly difficult burden
of proof placed on the employer with the passage of time be-
tween the initial suspension and subsequent reinstatement pro-
135. See Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085.
136. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Latta, never specified what evi-
dence would be required of the employer to prove the non-existence of the work-re-
lated injury. See Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085. However, it can probably be presumed
that expert medical evidence would not be required, especially in light of the fact
that before the burden was shifted to employers by Latta, the claimant was not re-
quired to provide such medical evidence. See Busche, 466 A.2d at 280 (holding that
medical proof of change in disability was not required in a reinstatement proceed-
ing); Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084-85 (interpreting Pieper as to not require medical proof
of the continuation of the claimant's work-related injury in a reinstatement proceed-
ing).




ceeding.'3 9 It is apparent that this recognition by the supreme
court is, in effect, notice of an impending modification or limita-
tion of the current precedent set by Latta.4"
Eric L. Bradley
139. See Latta, 642 A.2d at 1085 n.4; Pieper, 584 A.2d at 305.
140. The supreme court in Latta also cleared some apparent confusion as to the
applicability of the doctrine of res judicata. See Referee's Decision, Latta v. Latrobe
Die Casting Co., File No. 44886 & 45792 (1989) (asserting that res judicata was
applicable up to the time of the second physical examination which was subsequent
to the date of the closing of the record). The Latta court concluded that res judicata
was applicable up to the date the record was closed in a workers' compensation
case. Latta, 642 A.2d at 1084.
1995 739

